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Introduction
Innovation is a crucial factor for economic growth (Sena 2004) . The national innovation System (NIS), the system in which, first, knowledge is created and transferred and, second, invention and innovation occurs is central to the economic growth of countries and regions (Greenhalgh/Rogers 2010; Lundval et al. 2009 ). China's government is highly concerned with increasing the country's innovativeness and transforming China into an innovative nation by 2020 and, furthermore, a world leader in science and technology by 2050 (Serger/Breidne 2007) . Consequently, the current Medium-and Long-term National Plan for Science and Technology Development 2006-2020 (STDP) identifies the creation of endogenous innovation as imperative to advance China's NIS and thus secure the country's future economic growth (STDP 2006) . However, China's NIS originates from an underdeveloped top-down, centralized, and state-run system (Rowen 2008) .
Our empirical work attempts to answer the following two main research questions: how is the innovative performance of China's NIS in an international comparison? Who contributes to the innovative performance within China's NIS? We seek to answer these questions by relying on patent data. We employ triadic patent families to capture economically important inventions, to discriminate between mere numerous low-quality patents and fewer high-quality patents (OECD 2009; OECD 2004) . To the best of our knowledge, there is no study applying this methodology in order to assess the innovative performance of China's NIS although patent data allow for both a high objectivity and a high level of detail of our results and also enhance the comparability with other studies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section we survey the literature on NIS and provide a linkage to innovative performance measurable by patent data. Section 3 examines the origins of China's NIS in the command economy and the later amendments during the transformation economy. In Section 4, we describe the methodology and also present our results. In particular, we analyze the innovative performance of China's NIS in comparison to the technologically advanced countries Germany and the United States at the country level. Further, we assess the contributions of different kinds of local and foreign key organizations to the overall performance of China's NIS. Finally, Section 5 contains the discussion of results and further sets out implications for both practitioners and researchers regarding the policy measures advocated in the STDP.
Linking National Innovation Systems and Innovative Performance
Freeman is widely regarded as having established the foundations of the concept of national innovation systems (NIS) (Lundvall 2010; Balzat 2006 ). Freeman and his early followers took Friedrich List as a central point of reference and integrated contributions by Smith, Marx, Marshall, Schumpeter, and Arrow (Lundvall 2010; Lundvall et al. 2002) . Edquist (2005) criticized the resulting concept for being a diffuse instead of a systematic framework, also lacking theoretical foundation. In contrast, Lundvall et al. (2009) stress the theoretical elements of evolutionary economics. Finally, the NIS concept has been adopted by researchers and increasingly integrated different strains of economics of growth, industrial organization, the theory of the firm, and regional economics leading it to rapidly disseminate through the economics of innovation literature and gaining an important position in modern economic theory of innovation (Antonelli et al. 2006; Balzat 2006; Liu/White 2001) .
More recently, the NIS concept has been applied to map characteristics and differences in the structure of developing countries (Altenburg 2009; Joseph 2009; Padilla-Perez et al. 2009 ) and encounters special application in the analysis of Asian economies (Liu/Lundin 2009; Liu 2009; Jakobson 2007; Chen/Shih, 2005) . This can be linked to the idea that institutions are more important in the changing economic environment of developing countries than in developed countries (Lundvall et al. 2002) . Based on this approach, in an early but influential paper Liu and White (2001) developed a generic framework for the analysis of China's NIS. More recently a number of quantitative studies have been added to the literature, using patent data to measure different aspects of China's NIS (Hu 2010; Hu/Mathews 2008) .
A current definition reflects on a NIS as "an open, evolving and complex system that encompasses relationships within and between organizations, institutions and socio-economic structures which determine the rate and direction of innovation and competence-building emanating from processes of science-based and experience-based learning." (Lundvall et al. 2009 ). Consequently, the NIS framework allows for the analysis of innovation at the national level, explores the contributions of various organizations embedded in the institutional and socioeconomic environment, and ultimately offers a concept for interpreting "innovative performance" of the organizations as a result of the overall NIS' capacity (Balzat 2006) .
The term "innovative performance" is subsequently used synonymously with all activities that contribute to measurable outputs of technological innovations within a NIS. This paper measures the innovative performance of China's NIS by the patenting behavior of "key organizations". The term encompasses all relevant entities within China's NIS such as firms, universities, and research institutes (Liu/White 2001) that create innovative performance materializing in patent statistics. The innovative performance of the key organizations mirrors the preconditions for innovative output provided by the institutional and socio-economic structures of the NIS at large (Lundvall 2009 ). Based on this concept, the overall innovation capacity of the NIS is condensed into the innovative performance of the key organizations and subsequently measured by the volume and value of patent applications. This approach is similar to, for example, a company having various business units in diverse areas where its performance on the aggregated level can be measured in performance indicators such as revenue, profit, or return on investment. Given such a methodology for a NIS, patent applications offer informa- Frankfurt School of Finance & Management Working Paper No. 158 tion about the innovation capacity of the NIS at any given point in time. Obviously, with patent applications the market success of the protected inventions is not measured. Nonetheless, they constitute decisive preconditions for potential innovations, later product development, and market diffusion and, thus, resemble a unique indicator for the full breadth of key organizations in a NIS. In the following, we present the key organizations and the patent system as the determining factors for translating the NIS capacity into measurable innovative performance.
In the NIS of a market-driven economy, profit incentives determine the creation of new technologies by multiple, independent, and generally rivalrous organizations which rely on ex post market demand to select the most promising inventions, spur diffusion, and finally cause innovation (Nelson 1988) . In this setting, competition is not solely determined by prices, but by quality or efficiency and enhanced by the diversity of new products or processes (Schumpeter 1993) . Most key organizations, in particular firms, are engaged in a general process of Schumpeterian competition. Altogether, five Schumpeterian strategies exist: pioneers, adaptionists, complementors, imitators and mixed strategies. Firms and other organizations face difficulties in changing their strategies because of path-dependency and bounded rationality (Lundvall et al. 2002) . This translates into only slowly changing strategies in a population of firms and consequently into a NIS exhibiting a rather high degree of inertia. Therefore, the direction of change is determined by the original composition of the population. For example, pioneers would perform strongly in a population of complementors, while they would perform badly in a population of many imitators, and worst in a population dominated by other pioneers. What becomes obvious is the importance of a well-balanced population of firms in which the strategies of firms correspond to each other in the context of the overarching system.
While pioneers play a more important role in increasing the rate of innovation by radical innovations, the remaining strategies are more important for the diffusion and further exploitation of knowledge. This is also an integral part of a NIS and, thus, linked to the "absorptive capacity" of key organizations within the NIS. The term specifies the capacity of organizations to internalize new knowledge, generated inside or outside the system (Todorova/Durisin 2007; Zarah/George, 2002; Cohen/Levinthal 1990) . Absorptive capacity is of high relevance for the innovative performance of a nationally closed NIS, but is even more important in the context of an open NIS in which new knowledge is channeled into the system by foreign organizations, for example MNCs.
MNCs, defined as firms with operations in more than one country and hereafter synonymously used with the term "foreign firms", can contribute significantly to the infusion of knowledge and other resources into the NIS of a host country (Marin/Arza 2009) . Given the necessary condition that the host country is open and receptive to knowledge and technologies created abroad, the subsidiaries of foreign firms offer a potential mechanism of international involvement that enables the host country's NIS to get more direct access to existing technological competences originated outside the system (Chesnais 1988). Further, the host country's NIS can become part of the international processes of knowledge creation and diffusion, with the foreign firm as the intermediary between the NIS and a global knowledge network (Marin/Arza 2009).
By definition, MNCs are technologically superior to domestic firms of developing countries because of their potential to develop, accumulate, and take advantage of a unique set of tech-7 nological and intellectual assets (Marin/Arza 2009) . Consequently, in terms of the Schumpeterian strategies, we label foreign firms as "pioneers". In terms of the NIS concept, the most valuable resources for innovative performance are marked by scarcity in the endowment of the host system. MNCs can substitute scarcity in one host system by tapping into other NIS where the particular resource is more abound. Thus, foreign firms are capable of compiling a superior mix of resources and are more likely to introduce radical innovations than domestic firms of a developing country. Given an adequate level of absorptive capacity within the host system, the technical superiority of foreign firms positively affects domestic ones and other connected organizations by creating "spillover effects". Spillover-effects occur when a firm benefits from original knowledge generated by another firm, without incurring any costs (Criscuolo/Narula 2008; Cohen/Levinthal 1990) . Especially MNCs' subsidiaries engaging in R&D and training activities have a positive impact on both the productivity and the innovativity of domestic firms (Lan 2009) and thus contribute to the innovative performance of the host system.
Next to the R&D labs of firms, both universities and public research institutes are the two most usual kinds of research organizations. In particular universities maintain, first, interactions with the business sector and, second, relations to the society in general. In this way, they share functions with other key organizations involved in knowledge production but, more important, they influence the extent of knowledge diffusion as they are unlike firms not subject to same degree of competition (Nelson 1988b; Brudenius 2008) . However, the intensity of interactions can differ between certain countries. While universities in the US played a significant role for the development of several industries, their involvement in Japan were rather marginal and partly substituted by inter-firm R&D collaborations (Nelson 1988a; Freeman 1988) .
Over the last years, the establishment of organizational links between research organizations and the business sector became equally common since research organizations directed increasingly more resources in patenting for commercial purposes, at least partly for the purpose of technology transfer. In a critical tone, Dasgupta and David (1994) point out that the shift of resources towards commercial applications of scientific knowledge at universities and research institutes may, at least in the long run, harm a nation's capacity to benefit from sustained flows of innovations. Accordingly, a wide range of other studies stresses the socially wasteful implications of excessive patenting and the relation between R&D and patenting which becomes increasingly questionable (Sakakibara/Branstetter 2001; Hunt 2006 ).
A patent system is an institution within the NIS responsible for providing and processing patents. The purpose of patents is to stimulate invention both by granting a temporary monopoly to the inventor and by enforcing early disclosure of the information necessary for the production of the item or the operation of the new process (Griliches 1990) . The disclosure of the invention aims at reducing or even avoiding the duplication of work rendering this function of the patent system beneficial for society as a whole. Research based on patent statistics was first carried out in the 1950s by Scherer (1959) and Schmookler (1962) . Patent statistics are a formidable data source for the research on innovation due to their breadth, depth, and objectivity allowing researchers to draw comprehensive pictures of technological activity (Griliches 1990; Pavitt 1988) . "Patent statistics allow measuring the inventiveness of countries, regions, firms, or individual inventors under the assumption that patents are a reflection of inventive output and that more patents mean more inventions (OECD 2008) ." Patent statistics are by definition related to inventiveness and based on relatively objective and only slowly changing Frankfurt School of Finance & Management Working Paper No. 158 standards. Nonetheless, also volumes of patent applications and granted patents are subject to fluctuation across countries and time. The setup of the patent system determines which share of innovative performance ultimately translates into patent applications and, thus, can be captured by researchers as a measure of innovative performance.
It should be noted that the standardized design of the patent system does not come without criticism. The debate on the monopoly on intellectual property, involving the relationship between competition, market structure, and R&D, traces back to an argument advanced by Schumpeter (Gilbert 2006) . The conventional approach is to interpret IPR protection of the patent system as socially legitimate since the temporary monopoly granted to the successful inventor enables him or her to recover the costs incurred due to the inventive activity. This incentivation eventually encourages greater investments of resources in invention and, hence, fosters innovation, from which the society as a whole benefits in the long run. The counter argument is concerned with the possibility that the monopoly is too broadly designed and inhibits further invention in fields in which technological change is cumulative (i.e., one invention builds upon another) or systemic (i.e., the innovation system from which inventions originate is complex and highly interdependent) which is true, for example, with electronics, semiconductors, and IT (Cantwell 2006) .
In general, the literature assesses strong IPRs rather negatively. While some implications differ according to the goal pursued, weaker IPRs and corresponding shorter patent length are generally recommended (Boldrin/Levine 2009) . Stronger IPRs with a longer patent length will only be favorable if the intention is to increase the frequency of innovation, the output, or to support own technology standards. The corresponding negative effect in these cases is decreasing social welfare if the growth rate exceeds the socially optimal rate. Another negative effect is decreasing productivity and the decrease of indigenous innovation if the development of own standards fails (Dasgupta/Stiglitz 1980; Horowitz/Lai 1996; Sakakibara/Branstetter 2001; Moser 2005 , Hunt 2006 ).
The Development of China's National Innovation System
Concerning the underlying evolutionary theory of the NIS concept, it is conductive to start the investigation of China's NIS from its origins in the command economy (Liu/White 2001) . The original composition of the key organizations' population impacts the transformation of the system from a command economy to a market-oriented NIS, since it is impossible for the key organizations to change their strategies quickly due to of path dependency and bounded rationality (Lundvall et al. 2002) . In the case of China, these constraints explain the inert change of and within the country's NIS. In this section, we first frame the economical conditions during the formation of China's NIS. Then, we discuss the impact of the transformation process on the population of key organizations and the NIS.
The first National Science and Technology Development Plan (STDP) defined the formation of the NIS during the period 1956 through 1967. China imported 156 heavy industry facilities from the Soviet Union and established 400 research institutes which mainly focused on rever-se engineering (Liu/White 2001) . Prominent achievements were the development of atomic and hydrogen bombs in 1964 and 1967, and the launch of satellites in 1970 (Jakobson 2007 ). These scientific successes were based upon Soviet assistance which shaped a bureaucratically and hierarchical R&D structure of China's NIS, in which research was carried out by public research institutes while state-owned enterprises (SOEs) focused on manufacturing (Serger/Breidne 2007). The ultimate goal of the Chinese government during this period was the creation of national self-reliance (Liu/White 2001) .
Apart from just a few prestige projects, the division of manufacturing and diffusion of new inventions was not efficient. The public research institutes' scientific focus did not match the economy's requirements at large, as revealed by the example of the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) which is China's most prestigious research institute: "Its commercial inadequacy is captured in the observation that before reforms began in 1979, it had forty thousand inventions but commercialized none (Rowen 2008) ." With only four patents granted between 1950 and 1963, the importance of patent rights in China diminished until regulations ultimately permitted free use of all results of innovative performance (Ganea/Pattloch 2005) . Due to the lack of adequate technology developed domestically, SOEs continuously upgraded production capabilities through technology imports. Until the late 1980s, the investment by SOEs into technology imports dwarfed the investment into own R&D (Liu 2009 ). However, imported technology has seldom been enhanced afterwards. The Liberation Truck, for example, imported from the Soviet Union in the 1950s, was without changes reproduced during the subsequent 40 years of mass-production (Liu/White 2001) .
In terms of institutional economic environment the predetermined ex ante equilibrium and corresponding resource allocation left little motivation for the destruction of fixed equilibria and the creation of efficient ex post equilibria. This is further represented in rigid hierarchical vertically and horizontally interaction structures (Liu/White 2001), far away from "an open, evolving and complex system (Lundvall et al. 2009 )" of a modern NIS. Science-based inventions did not meet the necessities of production, while more "hands-on" experience-based inventions could not diffuse from the grassroots level due to the strict top-down system. The ultimate goal was not maximization of profits accomplished by creating new products and processes in a competitive environment (Nelson 1988) , but the fulfillment of production quotas. Correspondingly, and in a general absence of prices, a stronger focus on quantity rather than quality resulted in wasteful resource allocation, most severely during the Great Leap Forward (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) . Finally, due to closing down of nearly the whole education system, China lost an entire generation of scientists and other academics during the Cultural Revolution (1966 Revolution ( -1976 , causing extremely detrimental conditions for the later transformation of the country's NIS (Cao et al., 2009 ).
The National Science Conference in 1978 declared science and technology as the key among the four modernizations (Mu 2010) . In line with the "Reform and Opening Up" policies implemented after 1978, the doctrine of self-reliance was replaced by a strongly expanded orientation towards foreign technology. The transformation of the NIS was constructed as part of the overall transformation process from a planned to a market-driven economy. Firms were deemed to become leaders in innovation, embedded in an increasingly competitive environment and motivated by profits induced by innovative performance (Nelson 1988; Schumpeter 1993) . Consequently, hundreds of public research institutes were merged, abolished, or converted into enterprises (Jakobson 2007) . The remaining institutes were granted self-Working Paper No. 158 determination and independence, but also declined in importance within the emerging new structure of the NIS (Sun/Liu 2010) . Table 1 displays the change in the population of key organizations from the period of the command economy to the period of the transformation economy. Recalling the Schumpeterian strategies, we differentiate between pioneers, adaptionists, imitators, complementors, and mixed strategies (Lundvall et al. 2002) . During the command economy, domestic imitators show the highest presence within the population, while adaptionists and complementors are characterized by marginal attendances. Pioneers are generally absent because public research institutes failed to commercialize inventions and did not meet the demand of SOEs. Foreign pioneers are not physically present within the population but still impacted the NIS through imported technology and exploitation by local imitators. During the transformation period the constellation has slightly changed. The absence of domestic pioneers within in the population of key organizations and the corresponding lack of domestically created radical innovations demanded for substitution by foreign technology (Dobson/Safarian 2008) . Consequently, firms' foreign direct investment (FDI), technology transfer, and expertise have been a strategic propulsive power for improving the innovative performance of China's NIS after the "Reform and Opening-Up" policies (Jakobson 2007) . Besides the weak domestic capacity for radical innovations, also China's absorptive capacity was underdeveloped due to the command economy's heritage evidenced by the presence of complementors and adaptionists, although this capability is highly important for the diffusion of knowledge (Lundvall 2009 ). Hence, domestic firms remained focused on simple imitation without developing much potential for further modifications or improvements or even radical innovations. This trend was intensified by an increasingly dynamic business environment during the transformation process that offered numerous opportunities to generate profits without conducting R&D. Resulting from that, the population of China's domestic key organizations was determined by a high presence of imitators, relatively few complementors and adaptionists, and almost no pioneers. Recalling the origins of China's NIS development path, this constellation is hardly surprising. Organizations within China's command economy had not been exposed to fundamental drivers of a market-driven economy's modern NIS: profit incentives, competition, and an increasingly selective market demanding for a diverse set of products and proces-ses (Nelson 1988; Schumpeter 1993) . However, during the transformation period starting after 1978, these drivers did not directly trigger R&D intensity but allowed for business models relying on cheap labor and arbitrage strategies in extremely unsaturated markets.
From an institutional point of view, the key organizations had to adapt to their new roles and also the expanding opportunity set during the transitional economy. In the command economy, the particular organization was embedded within a grid of other organizations, while the mode of exchange was determined by the state's plan. In the setup of the transformation economy, organizations became increasingly free to choose their partners for research, production, distribution, and also the mode of cooperation. For example, the development of firminternal R&D units can be seen as a strictly new level of organization within the Chinese industry. These new opportunities translated into newly emerging networks where organizations were free to enter and leave both networks and markets according to their particular opportunities. The new degree of potential cooperation required not only new strategies to minimize transaction cost but also a supportive institutional and legal environment for the development and enforcement of contracts -previously unnecessary due to allocation by the plan.
The transformation process had been accompanied by the promulgation of several laws, most essential the Trademark Law in 1982, the Patent Law in 1984, the Technology Contract Law in 1987 and the Copyright Law in 1990 (Mu 2010) . Because of the important implication for the methodology developed in this paper, the development of the patent law is scrutinized in more detail. Supported by WIPO and the German government, the first patent law was enacted in 1984 (Ganea/Pattloch 2005) . The Patent Act of 1984 contained all basic elements of a modern patent system (Yang 2008) . Based on the first-to-file principle, inventions are protected by so-called innovation patents, China's patent type for protecting technological inventions. However, several relicts of the command economy remained within the first Act, for example compulsory exploitation and a generally weaker protection standard.
During the three subsequent amendments, most of the relicts related to the planned economy were altered. The amendment of 1992 introduced a general replacement of holdership by ownership patents and an extension from 15 to 20 years of protection as well as a broadening of the scope of patentable inventions. In 1994, China joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and the Chinese patent office became qualified to receive and process international patent application (McGregor 2010). The amendment of 2001 was required by China's WTO obligations. Important adjustments were the adoption of the TRIPS agreement and the harmonization of China's patent system with international standards. The new standards implemented by the TRIPS requirements included, first, standards to compute statutory damages and, second, guarantee hat state and non-state enterprises enjoy equal treatment in obtaining patent rights ). After an adjustment period China's patent system is regarded as basically consistent with the TRIPS requirements (Guo/Zuo 2007) .
The literature is critical regarding the introduction of too strong patent laws in general and in developing countries in particular (Cantwell 2006; Moser 2005) . Harmonization as triggered by TRIPS may slow down rather than accelerate economic growth if patent laws lead, due to convergence, developing countries to compete more directly with innovations from developed countries and consequently may reduce rather than increase variation of innovation among developing and developed countries (Moser 2005) . From this perspective, the monopoly granted by TRIPS could be too broadly designed and inhibits further innovation which is cumulative or systemic (Cantwell 2006) . Since China's NIS strongly depends on infusion of foreign Working Paper No. 158 technology this could be the case. On the other hand, TRIPS is an incentive for foreign firms to conduct R&D in China's NIS and protect resulting inventions by patents since the protection and enforcement has ultimately been harmonized with international standards.
Generally, the adoption of the practice of patenting must not be underestimated. Due to the comparatively young history and the fundamentally new rational, patenting was probably only internalized gradually by domestic key organizations in China's NIS. The increasingly high relevance of the patent system due to improving institutions fosters the application of patents as a mean of protection. Especially foreign firms in China might have used patents more actively since they are used to patenting and want to protect their technologies against the high presence of imitators within the population of China's NIS. Finally, the formerly poor enforcement of IPR improved during recent years, leading to more reliable protection.
Methodology and Data
The objective of this chapter is to develop the methodology and to describe the data. We measure the innovative performance of China's NIS and the key organizations by patent applications. Further, we compare the aggregated innovative performance of China's NIS on the national level over the period 1990 through 2005 with Germany and the United States to provide a thorough benchmark. Finally, we present the results regarding the key organization's innovative performance within China's NIS for the period 2003 through 2005.
Patent statistics are formidable data for the research on innovation since they allow drawing a comprehensive picture of technological activity and inventiveness under the assumption that patents are a reflection of innovative output (OECD 2008; Griliches 1990; Pavitt 2006) . Although patent statistics are based on relatively objective and only slowly changing standards, also patent data are subject to some fluctuation across countries and time. Since figures of patents granted fluctuate more than the underlying patent applications, data of patent applications represents a more stable and comparable average (Griliches 1990 ). More important, patent applications offer more current information than patent grants.
However, the literature also acknowledges other data for the measurement of innovation. A range of variables such as the number of innovative products and manufacturing processes, the percentage of current sales caused by innovative products, the overall expenditure for innovation, national R&D expenses normalized by GDP, the number of university graduates in the field of science and technology, or the percentage of high-tech goods in total exports can and have be used for cross-national analysis or comparisons over time. Regarding the measurement of innovation, all variables face different advantages and constraints (Dodgson et al. 2008; Souitaris 2003 ). On the one hand, input variables like R&D expenses offer the benefit of improved comparability between different actors, but do not provide information about the eventual innovation output. On the other hand, output variables like new products and new processes adopted during a specific time have the drawback that they are not directly comparable across different industries, regions or countries. Furthermore, they cannot provide information about the economic significance of these innovations.
In this paper we evaluate the innovative performance of the key organizations within China's NIS, represented by firms, universities, and research institutes, by patent applications. Patent applications offer information regarding the inventions created by the key organizations, but not the degree of diffusion within the NIS, or in other words the ultimate innovation. However, they indicate a decisive precondition for potential innovation and can thus be regarded as a throughput between input factors like R&D dollars and output factors such as final products. Data on patent applications is available for all applicants within a NIS and come with the name of the applicant. Nonetheless, the use of patent data for the evaluation of innovative performance does not come without caveats. Griliches (1990) refers to three major problems existing in the use of patent statistics for economic analysis: classification, capture, and intrinsic variability. While classification is a rather technical issue, the degree of capture is determined by the patent law and alternative means of protection in various industries of the NIS. Intrinsic variability of the patent's value is the most severe problem to address when patents are used as an indicator of innovative performance. Our approaches to tackle these problems are introduced in the following section.
Classification refers to the question whether patents should be assigned to the firm or industry that creates the invention or, alternatively, the firm or industry that exploits the patent. For example in the case of licensing, these firms can differ. Within our methodology patent applications are the measured variable, and patent applications are naturally assigned to the applicant of the invention. However, extensive diversification of firms and various mergers create enormous problems for assigning a patent application to the right inventor. For example, the applying organization can easily be a subsidiary or a separate division of a larger company. Furthermore, a company may change its name, ownership structures, place of headquarter or other variables that might be used to classify a company. Patent offices do not employ consistent company codes, which leads to the risk that aggregation of patenting numbers can be seriously incomplete (Griliches 1990 ). On the other hand, in statistics composed of single listings, companies might appear more than once due to different name spellings which demand successive manual checks and clustering of the raw data to customize what is publicly available into a form that is more meaningful for the purpose of economic and social research (Cantwell 2006) .
To tackle the issues discussed above we delete multiple listings of the applicant's name in the raw data, while summing up the number of total applications associated with the applicant under a single position. Further, we delete listings of separate divisions of a larger company and add the individual applications to the total of applications of the company group. In case of MNCs, it is difficult to determine the local origin of a particular invention, since internal knowledge networks lead to the cooperation of several more or less dependent subsidiaries. We tackle the problem by interpreting that the major part of the R&D process assumedly took place in the country where the first filing of the potential patent takes place. The MNCs' propensity to file an application is linked to the accessible knowledge of the company's internal network. Consequently, we consider the patent application's underlying invention as assumedly developed in the host country, while the decisive preconditional knowledge has been infused into the NIS from the MNCs global knowledge network. In order to reduce complexity, we link the source of the infused knowledge to the organization's country of origin. Although the knowledge might be developed by a global network of subsidiaries, we regard the country of origin as an appropriate geographic proxy. For foreign firms with less extensive global networks, the linkage to the country of origin is even more obvious.
Working Paper No. 158 The next problem to address is capture, or in other words, the limited scope of innovative performance reflected by patent statistics. Ideally, patent statistics could provide a measure of technological change, hence, a direct reading on the rate at which the production possibilities frontier is shifting outward (Griliches 1990 ). However, patents do not capture all inventions made in the economy and most of the inventions patented represent a minimum quantum of invention. Further, the propensity to patent is affected by differences in patent law among different NIS, by differences among industries in the importance of patents compared to other methods of protection, and ultimately differing rules and strategies in firms governing the patenting of inventions that are not expected to have high returns (Pavitt 1988 ). This argument has further implications for China's NIS, where the practice of patenting had to be internalized only gradually by the key organizations. Thus, we have to acknowledge that following Griliches (1990 Griliches ( , p. 1669 ) "not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are patented, and the inventions that are patented differ greatly in 'quality,' in the magnitude of inventive output associated with them."
The third problem stressed by Griliches is the intrinsic variability of the economic value of patents. The value of patents is highly skewed. Many patents represent minor improvements with little private economic value, but the tail of the distribution contains patents that are extremely valuable Schankerman/Pakes 1986) . Most of the low and medium value patent applications reflect incremental inventions of SMEs with the majority of applications referring to a value area from 300,000 EUR to 10 million EUR (Frietsch et al. 2010) . Patents with high values are primarily linked to radical inventions of very large enterprises or start-up enterprise (Frietsch et al. 2010 ). Various methods have been developed to measure private economic gains from an individual patent and solve the problem of intrinsic variability. These methods link value to patents due to different criteria such as whether the patent is licensed or not (Giuri/Mariani 2007; Sampat 2004), licensing revenues (Sampat 2004) , patent family size (OECD 2009), renewal history (Bessen 2008; Harhoff et.al.,1999; Schankerman 1998 ; Schankermann/Pakes 1986), opposition and litigation history (Harhoff/Reitzig 2004) , and expected sales values of patents (Gambardella et.al. 2008; Harhoff et al. 2003; Harhoff et al. 1999 ).
However, no standard measure has been developed for estimating the value of a patent since all approaches suffer from different limitations. The complexity is increased further when patent statistics are used for international comparisons, due to differences among countries regarding the cost, time and rigor of the patent examination and enforcement (Pavitt 1988) . For the comparison of inventions across countries, the analysis of triadic patent families is recommended (OECD 2009). A patent family is defined as "a set of patents (originating from the priority filing) taken in various countries (i.e. patent offices) to protect the same invention (OECD, 2004, 7) ." With this method, the home advantage bias can be reduced or eliminated. Counting patent families also avoids double counts and diminishes biases resulting from special bilateral relationships.
As discussed above, when patent data comes from a single patent office, many patents with little economic value are included while only a few patents within the data are of higher value. Only a proportion of the total domestically filed patents are subsequently filed abroad because extending protection to foreign countries increases the patenting cost for the inventor. The inventor is only likely to accept additional cost if the expected future revenues outweigh today's patenting cost. The results of filings at patent offices in different countries are patent families. Consequently, patent families capture the most economically important inventions and make the inventions included comparable to each other (OECD 2004) . The triadic patent family resembles a set of patent applications filed at three patent offices. A triad compiled of the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is favorable since these patent offices represent the most important patent authorities in the American, Asian, and European markets (OECD 2009 ). Further, they stand for the three most advanced global markets for technology and represent a high scrutinizing benchmark for foreign firms that aspire to compete in these markets. This makes the triadic patent family of EPO, JPO, and USPTO a very strong filter for the measurement of inventions containing high value (OECD 2004) .
We use the concept of patent family in our method to determine the value of the domestic priority application in the individual NIS. By choosing triadic patents, the upper tail of the distribution of patents is selected, increasing the information carried by these patent families compared to national counts. The respective domestic patent office is SIPO for China, USPTO for the United States, and Deutsches Patent und Markenamt (DPMA) for Germany.
In order to maximize the information extracted from triadic patent families the use of the earliest priority date (first application worldwide) and fractional counts (if more than one patentee is applying for the same patent, every patentee is associated with his or her fraction of the patent) is applied in our method (OECD 2009).
To summarize, the methodology of this paper is developed as follows: due to the intrinsic variability, the value of patents is highly skewed with many patents representing low economic value, while the tail of the distribution contains patents of high economic value Harhoff et al. 1999; Griliches 1990; Schankerman/Pakes 1986) . In case of international comparisons, the complexity increases further due to differences among countries regarding the cost, time, and rigor of the patent examination and enforcement (Pavitt 1988) . To tackle these problems we employed the filter functions provided by patent families because they capture most economically important inventions and make them comparable to each other (OECD 2004) . Triadic patent families are recommended for the comparison of inventions across countries (OECD 2009 ). Due to our concerns whether the strong selection of this filter is suitable for the development stage of China's NIS, we therefore also introduced a more moderate filter which is determined by domestic priority filing and only one additional filing at a patent office of a country within the triad. Finally we compare both results with the results of solely domestic filings. Resulting from this methodology, we derive the three value classes "high", "intermediate", and "low". It is necessary to recall that only the results of the high value class, and the results of the intermediate value class to a lesser extent, are suitable for international comparison. The domestic filings of the low value class can solely be employed for intertemporal analysis of a single country.
As a data source, the worldwide patent database PATSTAT (version of April 2009) was employed to derive our dataset. 1 This database includes all worldwide patent applications and patent publications. Determining the year a patent family is assigned to is not easy. That is because by definition a patent family is a bundle of numerous patent applications with different applications covering different geographical territories and having different patent filing dates. Yet, a single point in time needs to be determined according to the date when the protected invention enters the patent system the first time. Hence, the filing date of the first priority application within each patent family needs to be determined. The earliest priority applica-Working Paper No. 158 tion is the first time a patent application of the underlying invention appears in worldwide patent registers. It might happen that an invention is first patented in the US and later passed on to the Chinese Patent Office to gain protection in China. Here, the priority application is the filing in the US while the Chinese filing is a "derived" one. The priority filing date of an application has been used for two reasons. First, this date is the earliest recorded date of a patented invention and, hence, closest to the date of invention. Second, this date is robust to applicants' strategies of delaying subsequent applications in other countries since it refers to the earliest date when the patented invention took root in the patent register.
For the legislations we consider, we use all patent applications filed there. Based on the earliest priority application, we identify whether it is a domestic or a foreign invention. From a Chinese standpoint, an invention is domestic if the earliest priority application has been filed in China. Then, it is reasonable to argue that the inventive step which has led to the initiative to file a patent application has been taken place in China. Conversely, an invention is foreign from a Chinese perspective if the earliest priority application has been filed in another country. Then, the inventive step has been taken in that country and -later on -the applicant has sought to also gain protection in China by filing a patent application there which claims priority to the earliest priority application in the other country.
For each legislation, we then rank the applicants according to the number of applications, starting with the strongest applicant. The data for the cross-country comparison covers the 15 year period from 1990 to 2005. It is not reasonable to interpret later cohorts for the following two reasons: first, it takes time for applicants to build their patent families (i.e., to decide whether they file patent applications in other legislations the country in which the earliest priority application has been filed). Put differently, it takes several years after the earliest priority application until the final geographical coverage of the protected invention (making up the patent family) has been established. Second, patent applications underlie a secrecy period of 18 months after they have been filed to a patent office. Thus, with the version of April 2009, the most recent applications that are included in the dataset have been filed in late 2007.
In this study, we are interested in the innovative performance on the aggregated national level. Accordingly, we calculate the total volume of patent applications for China, Germany, and the United States. The comparison of the value-adjusted results allows for an evaluation of the innovative performances of the three countries' NIS. By using the innovative performance of the NIS of the technologically advanced countries Germany and the United States as a benchmark, we want to show how the innovative performance of China's NIS changed over the observed period. However, in particular for the case of China, we are aware that changes in volume do not only represent increasing innovative performance but also amendments in patent law and the gradually adaptation of patenting.
The data for the more specific analysis of the innovative performance of the key organizations within China's NIS covers the 3 year period from 2003 to 2005. Here, we are interested in the applicants with the highest numbers of patent applications. According to our method, high numbers of applications translate into a substantial contribution of the key organization to the overall NIS' innovative performance. Because we are interested in the peer group of these key organizations, we cover the 100 strongest applicants per value class. After clearing and clustering of the raw data we classify the key organizations according to the type and the country of origin. The results are generally comparable within the value classes but not among each other, due to the lack of a uniform conversion rate. Table 2 displays Now, we turn to the discussion of the results regarding the analysis of the key organizations' innovative performance within China's NIS over the period from 2003 to 2005. Table 3 displays the contributions of key organizations within the high value class. The table is structured according to patent applications and applicants differentiated by type, such as firms, university, institute, and eventually person, and by country of origin, here differentiated into domestic or foreign origin. The numbers of applicants and patent applications are marginal. Firms are the most significant contributors among all types of key organizations. Foreign firms are the major patent applicants. In general, they contribute around 80 and more percent of the total applications within the sample. Due to the strong filter, the observations in the sample are equal to the observations in the original population. Table 3 Applicants and patent applications in the high value class
Results
Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 Table 5 presents the composition of the low value class. Drawing on the three year average, around 66 applicants filed 16,500 patent applications per year, albeit this number grows around 80 percent annually. In the year 2005, the total applications by the key organizations within the sample clearly surpass the 20,000 benchmark. However, the number of applicants stays relatively stable while the patent applications per patentee on average increase from 200 in 2003 to 300 in 2005. Regarding the constellation of key organizations, firms and universities are leading and are almost on par regarding the number of applicants but firms clearly file more applications. Firms contribute more than 50 percent of applications within the sample, whereas universities contribute over 30 percent. However, when we compare the patent applications of domestic firms and universities in the three year average, we find that the total volume of patent applications by universities outweighs the contributions by domestic firms before 2005. Except for firms, foreign applicants do not reach significant levels of concentration within the sample. Surprisingly, we find a presence of individual patentees. Although only around 10 persons are represented annually, these file between 15 and 10 percent of the total volume and dwarf the volume filed by public research institutes.
To summarize, we find that volumes of patent applications rise in all three value classes over the period 2003 through 2005. In particular, the maximum values per class indicate strong growth rates of leading key organizations. Especially in the low and intermediate value class, the standard deviation increases annually, indicating that certain key organizations gain importance in comparison to the group. This is further stressed by the increasing 0.9 quartile and Working Paper No. 158 harmonic mean values. We find that firms and universities play the most important roles in terms of innovative performance. However, the dominance of universities declines in the intermediate and high value classes and the activities of foreign universities are negligible. Therefore, we are more interested in firms and focus on the constellation of domestic and foreign firms within the three value classes. In a nutshell, the strict filter of triadic patent families in comparison to the mass of patent applications unveils the overall low innovative performance of key organizations and China's NIS at large. The results reflect the poor preconditions for high value innovative output provided by the institutional and socio-economic structures and put China rather in the corner of an underdeveloped top-down, centralized, and state-run NIS instead of being open and evolving (Lundvall 2009; Rowen 2008) . In perspective, more than 99 percent of China's patent applications originate from the low value class, less than one percent originates from the intermediate value class, and only 0.01 percent from the high value class. In comparison to the more balanced composition of value classes in Germany and the United States, this reveals the different competencies of China's NIS. The results suggest in particular that for the considered period of time, China's comparative advantage exists in the creation of low value innovative performance, albeit increasingly in huge quantities.
The massive quantitative surge in the low value class, observable especially after the late 1990s, can be linked to both, the increased adaptation and utilization of the patent system on the one hand and the increasing innovative performance of the key organizations on the other. We could think of three sub-trends related to the emerging patent system having affected this growth simultaneously. Firstly, the general awareness of patents as means of protection and the consequential usage increased over time (Moser 2005) . Secondly, amendments and international harmonization of the patent law improved the protection of IPRs granted by patents and incentivized their utilization (Guo/Zuo 2007) . Thirdly, there might have been a stock of earlier inventions which became patented with delay and inflated the measure of innovative performance afterwards.
However, the first sub-trend was probably more relevant for patenting behavior during the earlier years and thus does not explain later growth. The second trend might have boosted patent applications, especially after the adaption of TRIPS, but only moved the underlying legal framework on somewhat comparable levels to Germany and the United States. The third trend is likely to have had, if at all, only a marginal influence. The stock of Chinese inventions was assumedly very small and would not have boosted application-volumes, if patented at all (Dobson/Safarian 2008; Jakobson 2007) . This suggests that the increasing volumes of patent applications during the later years are fostered by the adaption of TRIPS but eventually caused by the improving low-value innovative performance of the key organizations. Thus, increased protection and enforceability of IPR and the increasingly innovative performance of China's NIS on a large scale mirror both, the improved protection and capacity for inventiveness.
In the low value class, firms and universities are the dominant key organizations. However, when we control for the origin of firms, domestic firms underperform universities before 2005. Over three-forth of Chinese large and medium enterprises (LMEs) still do not operate R&D departments at all but, instead, focus on the exploitation of existing knowledge (Jakobson 2007) . Underinvestment in R&D is partly caused by thin margins that do not allow capital-intensive R&D projects and a dynamic business environment that offers various opportunities to generate profits without taking the risk caused by long-term capital lockup in R&D (Jakobson 2007) . Further, high abundance and low cost of labor encourage a substitution of Working Paper No. 158 investments into technologies by investments in cheap and flexible workers (Song/Zhang 2010) .
A new trend is led by relatively young firms in high-tech industries. The individual contribution of these companies to the innovative performance of China's NIS is significantly higher than of average LMEs (OECD 2007) . Firms corresponding to that group within our results are Huawei, ZTE, and BYD. Huawei and ZTE operate in the telecommunications industry and were both founded in the late 1980s. BYD operates in the automotive and high-tech battery industry. Compared to SOEs or privatized public research institutes, those firms are less exposed to the burden of transformation since they originate from an economic environment already more supportive for the creation of innovative performance compared to firms established during the period of the command economy (Liu et al. 2009; Lundvall et al. 2002) .
Huawei is one of the relatively few Chinese MNCs that developed R&D capacity abroad and engages in knowledge exploiting activities in other NIS (Rowen 2008) . In comparison to other Chinese firms in the low and intermediate value class, the firm's innovative performance is by far superior and renders the company as one of the domestic key organizations contributing the strongest innovative performance to China's NIS. Thus, in contrast to our initial assumption, not only foreign MNCs have the ability to substitute scarce resources of China's NIS by tapping into other NIS (Marin/Arza 2009; Chesnais 1988) . As a result, it becomes increasingly likely that Chinese MNCs can introduce radical innovations in the future. Accordingly, the development stage demands careful reconsideration because of diverse characteristics and cannot simply be classified as a plain developing country's NIS (Liu/Lundin 2009; Liu 2009; Jakobson 2007; Chen/Shih 2005) .
In some contrast to the term "low value class", we do not argue that these inventions are worthless. Considering the size of the Chinese market, a filing at SIPO covers a market with access of customers two to three times a filing at EPO. Recalling the limited capture of patents, many inventions that focus on adjustments for the Chinese market but do not represent absolute novelty are not acknowledged in the results (Griliches 1990 ). An example is given by Chinese shanzhai products. These products are low priced and locally adjusted versions of standardized global brand products which give Chinese customers another choice -albeit at the expense of the violation of IPRs. Firms starting as shanzhai producers can transform into companies that file high volumes of patent applications later, as illustrated by BYD (Boeing 2009). In other words, "experienced-based learning" can turn into "science-based learning" but is initially not covered by the capture of patent statistics (Lundvall et al. 2009; Griliches 1990) .
The central role of universities within China's NIS is linked to a wide set of complementary activities (Rowen 2008; OECD 2007) . In many cases, the results of these activities are growing patent portfolios, fostered by own research or R&D carried out by spin-off companies. The group of leading universities covered in the sample file more than 30 percent of total patent applications within the low value class. In most cases, patents are used for later commercial use such as licensing or sales. From this perspective, the strong collaborations with the business sector could result in a division of labor between universities and firms, where the first focus on R&D and sell the resulting patents to the latter for production or other commercial use of patents (Nelson 1988 ). However, the shift of too plentiful resources towards the commercial applications of scientific knowledge at universities can harm a nation's capacity to create innovations in the long run (Dasgupta/David, 1994) . Thus, the universities' new focus to withdraw partly from too abundant complementary activities and to re-focus on scientific research instead is viewed positively (OECD 2007) .
Our results suggest that public research institutes apparently only play a minor role, also caused by further restructuring and re-focusing on basic, strategic, and public good research (Rowen 2008) . In contrast to the relatively strong cooperation between universities and companies, the low volumes of patent applications by institutes imply a mainly scientific focus or the lacking intention for commercialization. For example, these institutes could carry out national research priorities associated with security issues and, therefore, seek other means of protection than patents since patenting implies disclosure to the (worldwide) public.
Gradually improving the conditions of the institutional and legal framework, an increasing stock of knowledge and steady support of new employees graduating from universities have generated an increasingly supportive environment to carry out R&D over the last decade. This development, supplemented by the continuous growth of the Chinese economy, is reflected and reinforced by more R&D-intense FDI but also by complementary functions to existing manufacturing and sourcing activities and, also, by the search for talent (Rowen 2008) . Both, knowledge exploring and exploiting activities by MNCs are observable in China (Rowen, 2008, 19) . R&D labs of foreign firms increasingly use China's talent pools and technologies to shift the focus from adaption and support to full-scale R&D operations (Rowen 2008) .
With more than 60 percent of all MNCs operating in China being engaged in R&D activities, foreign R&D operations accounted for around 30 percent in 2004 30 percent in (OECD 2007 . In total, 750 foreign R&D centers had been established by 2004; among them, the world's top R&D spending companies (Rowen 2008) .
Accordingly, the results of the intermediate value class suggest the increase of foreign R&D in China. In the intermediate value class, the innovative performance of foreign firms is particularly strong with around two thirds of the sample's volume and with a clear upwards trend. The main share of 78 percent of total patent applications in the period originates from Taiwanese firms like Foxconn. This MNC has access to a global R&D and production network with major facilities in Europe, North-America and Asia. Foxconn manufactures products for companies like Apple, HP, Nintendo, Sony, Motorola, Dell, and others. In 2004 and 2005, Foxconn alone contributed more than one-third of all patent applications within the population of the intermediate value class in China. This stresses the exceptionally authoritative position Foxconn has achieved by the combination of knowledge exploring and exploiting activities in China's NIS (Rowen 2008) .
Another foreign firm performing in an extraordinary way is LG. The Korean electronics conglomerate alone contributed between one and two percent of all patent applications within the population in the low value class -but does not appear in the other value classes. The results are in line with the long-term strategy, namely, shifting the firm's main R&D activities from Seoul to Beijing. In early 2000, the firm established its largest non-Korean R&D center in Beijing and employed around 1,600 entirely Chinese researchers until 2005 (Chen/Shih 2005) . Assumedly, LG is mostly engaged in knowledge-exploring activities in the low value class in which China has developed a comparative advantage (Rowen 2008) . Alternatively,
LG could seek for experience within the low value class before engaging in the R&D of high value patents. Working Paper No. 158 However, the overall results indeed show the dominance of foreign firms but also reveal the rather weak innovative performance of these firms as a group. Considering the strong engagement of MNCs in R&D activities and the high proportion of foreign R&D operations, the actual R&D output is rather moderate (Rowen 2008; OECD 2007) . Except for a few, foreign firms are setting up capacities but still struggle to carry out R&D associated with high value inventions. In particular, higher trust in the protection of IPRs within China's patent system is decisive to make China a favourable location for conducting ground-breaking research (Jakobson 2007; OECD 2007) .
Based on our results, the upper row "pre plan" of Table 7 displays the configuration of the population according to the five Schumpeterian strategies (Lundvall et al. 2002) . A high share of imitators is active in the plain imitation of technologies but does not contribute to innovative performance. Various constraints or the lack of incentives detain many firms from investments into R&D. Adaptionists and complementors are represented to a medium degree within the population. The increase of these types within the population is constrained by either or both, a low degree of absorptive capacity or the lack of resources for further advancement of imitations (Lundvall 2009 ). These types of key organizations normally generate incremental innovations based on radical innovations created by pioneers, and contribute to the diffusion of knowledge within the population. Due to a relatively small set of domestic pioneers, the majority of significant radical innovations are induced by foreign pioneers. However, given the low absorption capacity and weak ties between foreign and domestic companies but also domestic key organizations in general, spillovers have difficulties to prevail and expand (Lan 2009; Marin/Arza 2009).
Consequently, the constellation represents the worst case for the emergence and development of domestic pioneers, since these have to compete with established foreign pioneers but also face competition from domestic imitators (Lundvall 2002) . A recent empirical study in fact finds evidence for high degrees of competition between foreign and domestic firms but also solely among foreign firms in China' NIS (Hu 2008) . Despite the competition of domestic imitators, foreign pioneers stay in the market because incentives overweigh obstacles. However, domestic firms' potential to gain from the presence of foreign pioneers is limited because of low absorption and application capacities. Furthermore, the presence of foreign pioneers prevents the emergence and development of domestic pioneers on a large scale due to fierce competition..
In a stable but detrimental constellation governmental intervention can be considered to optimize the population of different types of key organizations (Lundvall 2002) . Generally, given a stable strategy mix with a too high proportion of imitators and a too low proportion of radical innovators, the position of imitators could be weakened and the position of innovators strengthened correspondingly. However, the Chinese case presents a more complex scenario considering the existence of relatively competitive foreign pioneers and the importance of these companies for the innovative performance of China's NIS, as revealed by the results. The foreign pioneers cause two effects in China's NIS. One the one hand, they contribute especially to intermediate-and high-value innovative performance. On the other hand, their presence provides a major constraint for the development of domestic pioneers. Consequently, the appropriate treatment of the population depends largely on the aspired development route and the development stage of China's NIS. However, a clear-cut classification of the development stage is difficult, since China's NIS is more developed and diverse than a plain developing county's NIS but also has not yet reached the benchmark set by developed countries like Germany and the United States (Liu/Lundin 2009; Liu 2009; Jakobson 2007; Chen/Shih 2005) .
China could take advantage of its comparative advantage in creating low value innovative performance on a large scale. To fully exploit the potential, the access of domestic key organizations to knowledge disclosed by foreign firms could be facilitated by reducing the patent lengths and scope. This eases the more direct competition with developed countries and consequently may increase variation of innovation (Moser 2005) . From this perspective, TRIPS could be too broadly designed for China's developing stage and inhibits further innovation which is cumulative or systemic (Cantwell 2006) . In contrast to 20 years protection granted by TRIPS, the welfare-optimizing length of patents is around 10 years or shorter, depending on the extension of the market and expansion of trade (Boldrin/Levine 2009 The development approach advocated in the STDP is rather at odds with our results. Indeed, the plan acknowledges numerous weaknesses, for example that the mere import of technology, without absorption and innovation, weakens the innovative performance of China's NIS. However, the solution presented differs from our approach and has also been heavily disputed between economists and the technical community during the drafting of the STDP. Economists pointed out that at the current level of development and comparative advantage, China should sustain its role as the world's leading manufacturer base while focusing on the upgrade of technological capabilities via spillovers created by MNCs on a cost-efficient level. The technical community, however, argued that China could not longer expect to receive core technologies from international sources and that overall technological spillovers showed a disappointing performance. Instead, China should pursue the development of endogenous innovation (Serger/Breidne 2007) .
Our results suggest a larger potential within China's NIS for the strategy proposed by the economists. However, the final STDP explicitly propagandizes the latter development strategy. In the STDP, a wide range of policies that ultimately aim to modify the population of key organizations is advocated. In particular, these policies contribute to the development of domestic pioneers. Thus, the policy mix includes measures to limit the competitiveness of fo-Working Paper No. 158 reign pioneers and domestic imitators, while improving the potential innovative performance by domestic pioneers. In line with the amendments of the procurement law, the import and duplication of technology is restricted. Further, the government practices a first-buy policy for domestically made hightech products. These policies incentivize domestic pioneers to create high-tech products due to de facto guarantees of substantial market demand. Domestic adopters and complementors can also benefit from these policies with delay. Foreign pioneers and domestic imitators, however, clearly face disadvantages because they are kept away from substantial segments of the Chinese market. Concerning the patent system, a strengthening of IPRs including enhanced protection and enforcement are advocated. Generally, these policies support all firms except domestic imitators. Nonetheless, the authors of the plan stress the intention to avoid the abuse of IPRs for unfairly restricted market competition or the obstruction of diffusion and application of patented knowledge. Another issue concluded is that TRIPS and technology standards may not serve China's interest, but serve the established leaders in innovation (STDP 2006; Moser 2005) .
However, this situation seems to present a dilemma, since IPR policies that support domestic pioneers equally support foreign ones. A hint how China seeks to solve this problem is provided in the 2009 patent law amendment. According to this regulation, all inventions completed in China must be reported to SIPO for confidentiality examination -regardless if the inventor plans to apply for a patent in China or in another country. This regulation will motivate most firms seeking patenting in third countries to apply for a PCT filing with SIPO as the receiving office. Furthermore, SIPO's scope of action has been enlarged by the 2009 amendments since compulsory licensing can be granted if the patentee fails to sufficiently practice the patent three years after it is granted or in case patents applicants and licensees do not meet domestic demand. Due to the fairly vague conditions, SIPO could undermine the detrimental effects of strong IPRs with compulsory licensing of foreign patents to Chinese companies (Clark et al. 2010 ).
Finally, the authors of the plan encourage the development of Chinese technology standards. This policy can have a dual impact. The firms affected by standard setting are the ones which come up with new technologies, hence domestic and foreign pioneers. If the Chinese government prefers or even makes China-specific standards obligatory, foreign companies are crowded-out from these markets unless they adapt their standards or introduce dual standards. The domestic pioneers benefit largely from this regulation as long as they solely focus on the domestic market. If these domestic pioneers aspire to become MNCs themselves, they will be confronted with the same problem foreign MNCs face in the Chinese market. Therefore, the development of China-specific standards is a short-term policy to encourage domestic pioneers and to constrain foreign ones. In the long-run, however, this policy could constrain the global competitiveness of Chinese companies. Table 7 summarizes the final result of a successful implementation and re-adjustment. The share of imitators is considerably reduced, adaptionists and complementors achieve a higher presence to support and adapt the spillover contributed by a high presence of domestic pioneers. The share of domestic pioneers has been reduced to a medium level -the potential competition for domestic pioneers has been limited accordingly. In contrast to the welfaremaximizing approach proposed by us, the overall goals of the STDP are consensual with an increase of the frequency of innovation, the output, and support of own technology standards. Therefore, stronger IPRs and a corresponding development of China's patent system can help to reach these goals. However, the possible negative effects of these policies can be decreasing social welfare, decreasing productivity, and decreasing endogenous innovation if the development of own standards fails (Dasgupta/Stiglitz 1980; Horowitz/Lai 1996; Sakakibara/Branstetter 2001; Moser 2005; Hunt 2006 ; Denicolo/Zanchetti 2010).
Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to answer the following two main questions: what is the innovative performance of China's NIS in international comparison? Who contributes to the innovative performance? We derive our results by drawing upon patent data allowing us to achieve a high degree of objectivity and also a high level of detail for our findings. To do so, we pro-Working Paper No. 158 vide insights by patent applications into different value classes (i.e., low, intermediate, and high) . This allows us to discriminate between the contributions of different kinds of local and foreign key organizations to the overall performance of China's NIS. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study also applying such a methodology in order to assess the innovative performance of China's NIS.
In a nutshell, our results unveil the overall weak innovative performance of China's NIS. In contrast to Germany and the United States, less than one percent of China's patent applications are of intermediate or high value. This figure suggests that China's comparative advantage exists in the creation of low-value innovations albeit increasingly in huge quantities. We do not argue that low value inventions are worthless per se. Yet, it depends how they are applied to the local market. A new trend is led by relatively young firms in high-tech industries.
In comparison to other Chinese firms, the contribution of rather young companies such as Huawei, ZTE, and BYD to the innovative performance of China's NIS is significantly higher. Huawei is by far the domestic key organizations contributing the strongest innovative performance. While public research institutes apparently play a minor role, the universities' strong collaborations with the business sector result in high volumes of patent applications and emphasize the central role of universities within China's NIS.
Constantly rising volumes of patent applications mirror both, the improved protection of IPR and the increasing capacity for inventiveness. Supplemented by the continuous growth of the Chinese economy, improving conditions are reflected and reinforced by more R&D-intense FDI. Foreign firms' innovative performance is proven by patents of intermediate and high value. For example, the Taiwanese company Foxconn contributes more than one-third of all patent applications within the intermediate value class. In sum, foreign firms are setting up capacities but still struggle to carry out R&D associated with high value inventions.
Due to a relatively small set of domestic pioneers, the majority of radical innovations are induced by foreign pioneers. The current constellation of the population presents a worst case, because domestic imitators and foreign pioneers hinder the emergence of domestic pioneersalbeit a necessary condition for the creation of endogenous innovation. To improve China's capacity of creating unique knowledge and producing high value inventions, the policy mix advocated by the STDP involves tax policies, amendments in the procurement and IPR law, and technological standard setting. In contrast to a welfare-maximizing approach, the overall goals of the STDP are consensual with an increase of the frequency of innovation, the output, and the support of own technology standards. Stronger IPRs can help to reach these goals. However, the possible negative effects of the advocated policies can be decreasing social welfare, decreasing productivity, and decreasing endogenous innovation if the development of own standards fails.
Finally, it is questionable if a policy mix focusing on the creation of endogenous innovation and national prestige technology is advisable considering China's current development-stage. The comparative advantage of China's NIS lies in the creation of innovation of lower value. If the improving conditions within China's NIS, including absorptive capacity and linkages between sectors and organizations, are upgraded further, the country can expect a mass of inventions of increasingly high value in the years to come. This scenario is more sustainable compared to a situation in which a limited number of national champions create technology for state-controlled projects with low welfare-gains for the overall economy, simply to prove to the outside world that China is capable of creating world-class technology.
